

The Religion of Ultimate Concern: Understanding Tillich

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Abstract

Man's religiosity is largely understood by the religions of the world, especially those of the Semitic heritage, with reference to God, supposedly a supranatural being considered to be the creator and sustainer of the universe. Man relates himself to God as self would relate to the world. The focus in this relation is the almighty God who is said to demand reverence from man. Faith, in this regard, is defined as belief, testified by the sacred scriptures, in such a God. This, at least, is the theistic understanding of man's religiosity. It is apparent that religiosity here derives its meaning and vitality from the relation man forges with the omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent God. Man is a being separated from God, and he becomes 'religious' only when he enters the religious arena of life and participates in religious activities. The problem with such an understanding of religiosity is that it harbors an inherent tendency to view life as divided between 'the sacred and secular', 'the holy and mundane'. It involves the breaking down of the unity of life into separate compartments. Tillich, though hailing from the same Semitic religion, deviates from such traditional understanding, and explains man's religiosity in terms of man's *ultimate concern*. He shifts the emphasis from theo-centrism to anthropocentrism and claims that religiosity can be properly understood only in the context of 'who man is'. Within this framework, the present paper is a modest attempt to study the concept of *Ultimate Concern*, a theme central to Paul Tillich's (1886-1965) philosophy of religion.

Keywords: Ultimate, Concern, Preliminary, Faith, God, Religion, Subjective, Objective, Psychology, Ontology, Sacred, Secular, Symbol, Idolatry.

Introduction

Few phrases in western philosophy of religion have become more popular, and yet more objected to, than Tillich's *ultimate concern*. The general objection is that the phrase is used by Tillich rather indiscriminately and that its use is extended from God to faith to religion without any specification of the context. This concept therefore requires clarity regarding

the meaning as implied by Tillich. Generally speaking, the unconditional of which man is immediately aware of has been understood as the ultimate concern of man. Not many would disagree with this use, in as much as they tend to think that Tillich have reason enough to be reticent about the traditional usage of terms like 'God'. This however is a very rudimentary and inadequate grasp of a concept, which is so fundamental to the

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whole of Tillichian thinking. Its extension to the personalized act of faith is not without a deep significance to Tillich. I shall, however, in this paper not enter into a discussion of the understanding of religion as the *ultimate concern*, but will restrict myself to the first two usages. The schema of this study is to sketch a critical descriptive outline of the concept of the *ultimate concern* and to achieve this purpose the paper has been broadly divided into five parts. In first part, I shall introduce the concept of the *ultimate concern*, as understood by Tillich, as applicable to faith and the content of faith. I shall discuss the subjective aspect of the concept, which is faith, in the second part. Thirdly, I shall briefly elaborate on the risk of faith, which may be considered a corollary of the subjective aspect discussion. In the fourth part, I shall discuss the objective aspect of *ultimate concern*, which involves the concept of God. Finally, I shall focus my attention on a feature of Tillich's philosophy of religion that endeavors to identify the two aspects of the concept, that is, 'the ultimate act of faith' and 'the ultimate of the act of faith'. In showing this unity of the subjective and the objective aspects of *ultimate concern*, it is hoped that the critics of Tillich may be satisfied, at least, to some extent.

Descriptive Delineation of Ultimate Concern

The adjective in the phrase *ultimate concern* in Tillich's philosophy is a theological heritage, in as much as Tillich is a theologian even before he can think of a Christian philosophy. Again, the noun in the phrase is

what he owes to the Existentialist philosophy, in particular, that of Heidegger. 'Concern' is the existential category of care or *sorge* (Heidegger 1962). When it is stated that we are concerned with something or someone, we thereby mean that we care for that something or someone. Tillich transposes the unified meaning of these two terms to his philosophy of religion. *Ultimate concern* is the existential concern about the meaning and fulfillment of our lives. As existential, this concern underlies every human activity emanating from every sphere of life. No question is more necessary, elemental and inescapable than the question of one's own being. Shakespeare's depiction of Hamlet's existential dilemma of *to be or not to be* profoundly expresses this ultimate question of man's being: What is the meaning of human life? How shall I find my true being? This existential question is ultimate, not only in the sense that it delves into the human nature, but in the sense that it makes man aware of his own self-transcendence (Tillich 1968 II Volume 8). In other words, the question points beyond man and therefore the question on man's being surpasses man. It takes the form, "Is man's quest for life and true being conditioned by a ground of being, an unconditional Being, in whose power the being of man may be said to participate?" The term, *ultimate concern*, thereby unites man's most urgent existential question with the concern about Being-itself, as classical metaphysicians are wont to elucidate. Tillich is a product of that same tradition, if he applies it now to God, transformed into the Being-itself, and to man's subjective attitude to it.

Ultimate concern then, for Tillich, has two meanings. First of all, it is an act, a concern, an attitude of one's subjectivity. It is the attention of the mind directed towards a particular object. However, it is not just a concern that man exhibits every now and then in the material and psychological satisfaction of his immediate needs. As a matter of fact, there are many things with which man is immediately concerned: food, clothing, housing, wealth, comfort, sex, name, fame, success, power, personal status and so on. For Tillich, these concerns are not ultimate but only preliminary concerns of day to day existence. The *ultimate concern*, on the other hand, is of ultimate importance, in as much as it refers to the fulfillment of the being of man. Man's religion here directly comes into the picture. Tillich writes, "The moment religion comes into the picture, then it is not a matter that is 'also' important, or 'very' important or 'very, very' important. For then nothing is comparable with it in importance. It is unconditionally important. That's what ultimate concern means" (Tillich 1965, 20). In qualifying it as the ultimate, the concern is said to transcend at once all preliminary concerns of one's physical existence. It directly affects the reality, the structure, the meaning and the purpose of one's existence. Such a concern is termed by Tillich as faith. One of his works begins with the statement, "Faith is the state of being ultimately concerned: the dynamics of faith are the dynamics of man's ultimate concern" (Tillich 1957, 1). Tillich obviously speaks here of religious faith. Faith as the state of being ultimately concerned is an attitude of one's

subjectivity towards something infinite, as only what is infinite can have an ultimacy within it. It is an act of the total personality, at once cognitive, emotive and conative. It is rooted in the center of personal life, and thereby becomes a centralized personal act. Thus, viewed as an attitude, the *ultimate concern* is the abstract version of the great Judeo-Christian imperative of the 'love of God with our whole heart, mind and soul' (Gospel of Matthew 22:37; Tillich 1968, 14). Therefore it is a faith that originates out of love and fructifies in love. In being the ultimate the concern is made unconditional, total, infinite and eternal.

Secondly, Tillich also spoke of the *ultimate concern* as the object of the attitude we call faith. If faith is primarily a concern about something, the concern has for its intentional object God. Thus God now becomes the *ultimate concern* for man. Faith, as the state of being ultimately concerned, can only be concerned about that which is the ultimate. It is the characterization of the ultimacy of the object of faith that distinctively makes the faith religious faith. As the object of the state of the mind, the ultimate concern is synonymous with God. This is more so, because it is said to be unconditional, total, infinite and eternal - all the attributes we traditionally ascribe to God in a theistic theology. In contradistinction to preliminary concerns, God is thus said to be man's *ultimate concern*. As a psychological attitude, then, *ultimate concern* may be faith, but, ontologically, it also refers to the reality of God, or Being-itself. Thus, for a descriptive delineation we have in the

concept of ultimate concern a two-fold aspect, one subjective and the other objective. Referring to the dual senses of *ultimate concern*, Tillich says that the concept “is intentionally ambiguous. It indicates, on the one hand, 'our' being ultimately concerned on the subjective side and, on the other hand, the object of our ultimate concern for which of course there is no other word than 'ultimate'” (Tillich 1965, 11).

The Subjective Aspect

The concept of faith is at the heart of the subjective side of the *ultimate concern*. According to Tillich, man is immediately aware of the unconditional (Tillich 1959, 10). This immediate awareness, however, is not faith. For the immediate awareness of the unconditional is not characterized by faith but by self-evidence. Faith is built on this self-evidence. However, it further contains a contingent element and, more importantly, involves a risk. It may be said to combine the ontological certainty of the unconditioned with the uncertainty about the conditioned and the concrete. The risk of faith is on account of the conditioned and the concrete. For the *ultimate concern* is directed to the unconditional, only in as much as the unconditional appears in concrete embodiment. It is clear, then, that faith follows, or results upon, the immediate awareness of the unconditioned, which is the ground of our being. However, the relation involved here is not so much epistemic as ontological. It means that faith as *ultimate concern* is possible, because an *a priori* awareness of something unconditional is already present to the human being as its foundation. This immediate awareness is a

point of identity, where the polarity of subject and object has not yet emerged. But the unconditioned, if it has to be a matter of human concern, must become concrete, to human consciousness, that is to say, it must appear in a concrete embodiment. The concrete medium may be a person or an object or an idea or a goal. Faith comes into the picture only when the unconditioned is refracted and reflected in the concrete conditioned something. Faith is the state of mind of an individual, who is grasped by an ultimate concern through the expression of a concrete and a specific form of the unconditional. Faith in its epistemic content is non-doxastic. It is not something like 'belief of p implies belief of q'. Rather, it is to know p in the sense that *p is self-evident* and therefore unconditional. It is in juxtaposition to reason. Faith then, in the process of its actualization, takes something concrete as the expression of the unconditioned, thus, at once opening itself to the trial and the risk of faith. In faith man is able to associate the ontological certainty with the uncertainty about that something (indeed, everything) conditioned and concrete, that arrests the human consciousness. This way of understanding faith may not be free from philosophical difficulties, but Tillich's perception is still remarkably insightful. Thus, it may be argued that one cannot really understand why Tillich felt the need to presume an ontological immediate awareness of the unconditioned, and then demand the concretization of the unconditioned. For if man can discover the unconditioned within himself then there possibly is no need to look for the unconditioned outside and, contrariwise, if the unconditioned must take

the form of a concrete reality, that is to say, if it can be experienced through its concrete embodiment, then, it may suggest that the immediate awareness Tillich speaks of has no place. For it is not possible that man can be immediately aware of the unconditioned and, at the same time, also look for it in the world. But Tillich, possibly, to make room for the variety of religious experiences within the cultural and natural contexts, goes on to suggest that, "The unconditioned of which we have an immediate awareness, without reference, can be recognized in the cultural and the natural universe" (Tillich 1959, 26). Scholars may have seen in this assertion an ambiguity in Tillich's philosophy of religion. However, this may be his novel way of overcoming the limitation of traditional supranaturalism and naturalism alike.

In the concept of the *ultimate concern*, conceived by Tillich as faith, we can therefore distinguish two elements. Firstly, there is the unconditional, or the infinite element and, secondly, there is the conditioned, or the contingent element. The one is the universal, and the other is the concrete element. The former is the universal element implicit in all acts of faith, irrespective of its physical or cultural expressions. All these expressions of the act of faith participate in the universal element of the unconditionality. In this participation, man as a finite being is grasped by something infinite, the unconditional. This is the formal element that constitutes faith across the religious cultures. The latter may be called the material element of faith. The concrete and individual manifestations may differ in degree and nature, not only within a

single faith, but among the faiths across the whole range of cultures, religions and nations. Tillich considers this contingent element as a necessity of faith (Tillich 1957, 59). Tillich says, "Faith as the state of being ultimately concerned lives in many forms - every religion and cultural group and to a certain degree, every individual is the bearer of a special experience and content of faith" (Tillich 1957, 55). The content of faith is equally important for the man of faith, because it is through it that he experiences the ultimate concern. But, then, Tillich advises us that we should not confuse the content with the concept (Tillich 1965, 22). He says, "Faith is the state of being ultimately concerned. The content matters infinitely for the life of the believer, but it does not matter for the formal definition of faith" (Tillich 1957, 4).

What Tillich aims at suggesting here is that faith is essentially the concern for the ultimate, whereas the medium through which this concern is expressed, in itself significant though, is secondary in importance conceptually. This distinction is explained by Tillich himself, drawing a parallelism between faith and morality, with the help of Kant's absolute distinction between the unconditional character of the moral imperative and the innumerable different contents the imperative can have (Kant 1788; Tillich 1957, 53). The modern man, if he can perceive this difference, need not be disturbed by the primitive savage who may at times hold opposite views on ethical issues as dear. For the moral imperative for the savage is as unconditional in the realm, in which he experiences personal relationship, as it is for

anyone. All, the savage no less than the modern man, stand under the same unconditional character of the moral imperative. Even so all have the essentially the same faith, yet with different contents in their manifestation. This distinction between the concept and the content of faith is important for Tillich's philosophy of religion. It enables him to achieve two objectives. In the first place, through this distinction, he takes the concept of God beyond the God of theism: 'God' now becomes the symbol of God, the *ultimate concern*. God transcends the symbol of God. Secondly, he widens his definition of religion beyond the traditional idea as a specially organized institution to something that embraces the whole range of human life – politics, arts, education, philosophy, science and so on. With this the dichotomy in life between the sacred or religious, and secular, in a way, crumbles. Faith is said to transcend traditional religion for the *ultimate concern* is also present in what is usually called the secular or the profane. Religion now represents the dimension of the 'depth' that undergirds and informs every aspect of life. Religion as traditionally understood can also point to that which is ultimate, infinite and unconditional in man's life. And this can appear in many forms. Tillich believes that the 'conflict of religions' can be better understood, if we first clearly comprehend such a concept of faith and religion. If a Christian cannot see the ultimate concern in a Moslem, but rather immediately asserts that he is not a Christian and thus has no ultimate concern, he cannot genuinely understand other's religions. To overcome such conflict it is important to recognize that

the same concept of faith operates in every religion, despite the diversity of contents.

The Risk of Faith

Faith is, then, for Tillich, an act of a finite being who is grasped by the ultimate. Faith is certain in so far as it is the experience of the infinite, as the philosophers are wont to speak of, or the experience of the holy, as the religionists are wont to speak of. The ultimate is the reality given to the self with its own nature. It is the immediate ground of all experience, and, as such, is beyond all doubt. But faith is uncertain, in so far as the infinite to which it is related is received not only into a finite content but also received by a finite being. Thus there is in faith always a mixture of the infinite and the finite elements, interests, psychological motives that often makes the faith in question questionable. There can therefore be no certainty about the content of our ultimate concern, be it the nation, or personal success, or the 'God' (of the Vedas or the Bible or the Quran) or whatever. Their acceptance as a matter of ultimate concern opens itself to a risk. This brings us to the question of the preliminary concerns. A careful perusal of Tillich's writing shows that the preliminary concerns are often taken as synonymous with the concrete and finite objects of the attitude of faith. He distinguishes two possible status of preliminary concern or, to put it more clearly, two possible relations of preliminary concern to that which concerns man infinitely (Tillich 1968, 15). The first possible relation is obtained in a situation, where a preliminary concern elevates itself to the status of ultimacy. Here, the preliminary concern usurps the rightful place of the ultimate by putting on itself a sense of the

ultimacy. This may be said to directly oppose faith by being 'idolatry'; the concerned faith has now become idolatrous (Tillich 1957, 12). In idolatry something essentially conditioned is taken as the unconditioned, or the ultimate; something essentially partial is boosted into universality; and something essentially finite is given the infinite significance. The second is the relation, in which a preliminary concern becomes the vehicle of the ultimate without claiming any ultimacy for itself. The finite vehicle, or the medium, is not elevated to infinite significance, nor is it placed beside the infinite or on equal footing. Rather, in and through the finite, the infinite becomes real to man. In other words, it becomes the bearer of the holy, or the concrete embodiment of the holy as experienced by man. The medium becomes transparent to man, and through it the ultimate becomes present to human consciousness. To Tillich, any finite medium, through which the infinite becomes transparent to religious consciousness, is a religious sign, or symbol. Symbol then has a transparency to the divine. This epistemic condition in the dynamics of faith demands epistemic responsibility on the part of the knower.

Tillich acknowledges that the finite is inadequate to completely express what is of *ultimate concern*. The human mind, however, may forget this inadequacy, and identify the 'sacred' object with the ultimate itself. Its character as the bearer of the holy, pointing beyond itself, now disappears. The act of faith is no longer directed towards the ultimate itself, but towards that finite medium which represents the ultimate - the tree, the Buddha,

the Jesus, the ritual etc., as the case may be. In such cases, 'that particular expression of ultimate concern becomes confused with that towards which they point: the ultimate' (Tillich 1965, 73). The transparency of faith is then lost. The faith that has lost its transparency to the ultimate ceases to be the *ultimate concern*. The dynamic link between the preliminary concern and the *ultimate concern* is irrevocably snapped to vitiate the nature of the subjective aspect of the *ultimate concern*.

The Objective Aspect

Faith, viewed as an attitude of the subject, is the concern for the ultimate. This ultimate as the object of faith is the objective aspect of the concept of the *ultimate concern*. Tillich observes, "There are innumerable ultimate concerns which are concerned with the ultimate. And the whole question is: What is the ultimate?" (Tillich 1965, 50). It is already seen that the various concrete forms of faith cannot in themselves be the ultimate, because they are invariably characterized by an object which is finite, limited and conditioned. They fail to be *ultimate concern*, because the objects to which they are directed are conditioned, therefore, preliminary concerns. They cannot be the ultimate because they are transitory in their character, not merely quantitatively but also qualitatively; they are equally transitory in their meaning and their system of values. How do we determine the *ultimate concern*? Tillich believes that there is a way of determining the true object of faith. He says, "There is a criterion, namely, the word 'ultimacy', and ultimacy means nothing finite. Nothing which by its very nature is finite can rightly become a matter of ultimate

concern” (Tillich 1965, 24). In another passage he makes it explicit, “The ultimate concern which is faith is the concern about the unconditional. The infinite passion, as faith has been described, is the passion for the infinite - the ultimate concern is concern about what is experienced as ultimate. In this way we have turned from the subjective meaning of faith as a centered act of the personality to its objective meaning, to what is meant in the act of faith” (Tillich 1957, 9). Tillich uses adjectives like unconditional, infinite, ultimate to designate the object of the act of faith, and, we know, these are qualities which are usually associated with the concept of God. Unlike the preliminary concerns which are temporal, partial, bound in space and time, the true object of faith that is *ultimate concern* is eternal and total. Therefore God is said to be man's *ultimate concern*.

It is clear from Tillich's criterion of true ultimacy that he associates particularity with finitude, and that which is finite cannot be truly ultimate. It now follows that anything that can be a particular object of awareness and pursuit by an individual subject is *eo ipso* disqualified from being the true object of ultimate concern. Therefore the truly ultimate cannot be specified as far as our ordinary knowledge and our ordinary language is concerned. Tillich maintains that God, beyond all characterization of knowledge and language, must be the Being-itself. The reality of the being-itself is the reason, or the ground for there being anything. Being-itself is the ultimate. This ultimate, being-itself, should not however be confused with the gods of religions or the human idea of a god, despite the fact that the

latter can serve as symbol of the ultimate. This is also the reason for Tillich being wary of the use of the term 'God' for the ultimate of faith. Besides, he thinks that the neutrality of a term 'ultimate concern' would be generally acceptable to theists as well as antitheists.

The Ultimate Act of Faith and the Ultimate of the Act of Faith

It is evident from the above discussion that the phrase *ultimate concern* can be ambiguous, as acknowledged by many philosophers of religion. It can mean either the subjective or the objective aspect of faith. As a psychological attitude, it is an act of faith on the part of the believing individual. But, at the same time, ontologically, it refers to the reality of God or being-itself. What are we to make of these twofold aspects and more importantly, of the shift from psychology to ontology in Tillich's thought? Why did he use a single common term for both? Is there some hidden meaning behind? Has Tillich unwittingly fallen a prey to the category mistake? Or, is it the case that, for Tillich, human psychology is inextricably linked with divine ontology? Going by the explication of the twofold aspects of the ultimate concern, it would appear to us that the problem here is one of the relation between 'the ultimate act of faith' and 'the ultimate of the act of faith', the one representing the subjective aspect and the other the objective aspect of the *ultimate concern*. The two are intimately related in as much as the being of man is continuous with that of God so much so that all self-discovery of man is to end with himself as grounded in God, the *ultimate concern* of man. Tillich believes that the mind of man is the only mind

that can be aware of an ultimacy (Tillich 1965, 12). This however does not mean that without a human mind there is nothing ultimate. The ultimate is in no way dependent ontologically on the mind of man. It only means rather that man is possibly the only being who is aware of the ground of being of everything that is. It bespeaks of an intentionality of human mind to the divine being, or the ultimate ground of the human nature. Tillich says, "The word 'concern' points to two sides of a relationship between the one who is concerned and his concern. In both respect we have to imagine man's situation in itself and his world. The reality of man's ultimate concern reveals something about his being namely, that he is able to transcend the flux of relative and transitory experiences of his ordinary life. Man's experiences, feelings, thoughts are conditioned and finite. They not only come and go, but their content is of finite and conditioned concern, unless they are elevated to unconditional validity. But this presupposes the general possibility of doing so, it presupposes the element of infinity in man. Man is able to understand in an immediate, personal and central act the meaning of the ultimate, the unconditioned, the absolute, the infinite. This alone makes faith a human possibility" (Tillich 1965, 8).

This is a significant passage which Tillich has carefully crafted and it resolves to an extent the confusion in respect of the ultimate concern. Here, Tillich is not making the ridiculous claim that human beings are infinite. He rather suggests that ultimacy and the unconditionality are part and parcel of the conceptual apparatus of human mind, which

enables man to transcend the realm of finitude. The possibility is at once one of self-transcendence, too. Tillich is willing to grant, however, that man is a finite being, and that he is estranged from the ultimate ground of his being. But man is also immediately aware of the ultimate, and this is what enables man to be ultimately concerned. It is a form of the human mind's participation in the ground of its being. To be ultimately concerned about God means to overcome our estrangement from the ground of our being, thanks to Tillich's ontological approach to philosophy of religion. God is not another, an object, which we may know or fail to know, but being-itself, in which we participate by the very fact of existing. God is already present to us as the ground of our being. Therefore to be ultimately concerned about God is at once to express our true relationship to being as such. In a sense, it is the discovery of his 'identity' with the ground of his being. In this way the cleavage between the subject of faith and the object of faith is overcome by Tillich by way of rooting the subjectivity of the man of faith in God's own maximum subjectivity, which is also the 'object' of that faith.

Conclusion

What Tillich has philosophically formulated is an experience of the mystics across the religious cultures. In the experience of God, the distinction between the subject who experiences and the ultimate 'object' experienced is said to temporarily disappear. This distinction loses its meaning because the man of faith becomes suffused with God. The believer is immersed in the eternal, all-pervasiveness of God. It is however important

for Tillich, the Christian philosopher that he is, that the nature of the identity asserted is only mystical in nature. Tillich is in no way asserting an ontological identity between God and man, as it would be in certain forms of oriental mysticism (*tat tvam asi*). The distinction is not compromised, but is overcome, when, in the moment of faith, the person mystically becomes one with God. The sense, in which the identity and difference between the subjective and objective aspects are to be understood, is of great significance to us. It is liable to be mistaken, even when one proceeds on the right premises. Alston's conclusion is a clear point at issue. He says, "As Tillich explained 'ultimate concern', the ultimacy is psychological; it consists in the supremacy of that concern in the psychic structure of the individual. It is in a quite different way that being-itself is thought by Tillich to be ultimate. It is ontologically ultimate by virtue of the fact that it is the ultimate ground of all being. Once this distinction is made, we can see that there is no reason to suppose that (psychologically) ultimate concern must be concern directed to what is (ontologically) ultimate. But the verbal identity may make the transition seem obvious" (Alston 1961, 20).

I tend to believe, Alston's assessment here is mistaken, despite the sound premises that he has begun with. He has overlooked an important feature. Tillich accepts the possibility of the psychological ultimate concern to have anything for its object. If the object is not ultimate, then the act of faith is misplaced and it is idolatry. On the contrary,

genuine faith is only where the act of faith is directed towards the ultimate. Only in this sense, the act of faith and the object of faith always go together. In true faith both must be ultimate. The distinction between the psychology and the ontology of faith disappears in the union of both. Tillich insightfully writes, "The term ultimate concern unites the subjective and the objective side of the act of faith - the *fides qua creditur* (the faith through which one believes) and the *fides quae creditur* (the faith which is believed). The first is the classical term for the centered act of the personality, the ultimate concern. The second is the classical term for that towards which this act is directed, the ultimate itself, expressed in the symbols of the divine. This distinction is very important, but not ultimately so, for the one side cannot be without the other. There is no faith without a content towards which it is directed. There is always something meant in the act of faith. All speaking about divine matter which is not done in the state of ultimate concern is meaningless because that which is meant in the act of faith cannot be approached in any other way than through an act of faith" (Tillich 1957, 10). The act of faith and the object of faith then cannot be understood without reference to each other and they cannot be seen in isolation. This is the bedrock of the Judeo-Christian faith to which Tillich belongs and he may be said to have largely succeeded in conceptually elaborating the inextricable link between the ultimate act of faith and the ultimate of the act of faith.

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